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Does BPO pay off at the firm-level? Although there are several studies which analyze the 
potential benefits of BPO, there is a virtual absence of research papers on BPO outcomes. 
Based on an analysis of 137 Business process outsourcing (BPO) ventures at 254 German 
banks in a period between 1994 and 2005, we found that the outsourcer’s financial 
performance in terms of profitability and cost efficiency was increased significantly 
compared to industry peers without BPO. The increase stems not from workforce reductions 
but rather from increased employee productivity. Further, we show how BPO governance 
ensures BPO success: individually negotiated outsourcing contracts help to improve cost 
efficiency and profitability measures. Relational governance based on trust has only positive 
effects on profitability.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In today’s dynamic environment, characterized by growing business and technological 
uncertainties, corporations are faced with various new challenges. The organization of market 
places has shifted from pure hierarchy- and market-based modes to hybrid arrangements 
involving significant vendor participation. Triggered by these emerging new market 
structures Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) is gaining importance among new forms of 
business to business exchanges.  Hence academic research has started to focus on BPO and 
postulates that BPO bears unique potential (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998; Gottfredson, 
Puryear, and Phillips, 2005; Willcocks et al., 2004) that, however, is accompanied by severe 
risks (Aron, Clemons, and Reddi, 2005; Gewald, Wüllenweber, and Weitzel, 2006). 
Willcocks et al. (2004) stress the knowledge potential of BPO as the processes are often close 
to the outsourcer’s core business. Thus by leveraging the core capabilities of both the 
outsourcer and the vendor, BPO can even be a source of competitive advantage (DiRomualdo 
et al., 1998). On the other hand, BPO has also been shown to reduce costs and achieve 
efficiency rents. But do these expectations match reality? Does BPO fulfill the expectation 
that it will accomplish both efficiency improvements and provide a source of competitive 
advantage? Taking a firm-level view, we therefore aim to answer our first research question:  
RQ1: What is the impact of BPO on firm performance? 
As BPO offers unique potentials that are accompanied by distinctive risks, organizations are 
unprepared for their governance (Aron et al., 2005; Mani, Barua, and Whinston, 2006). When 
BPO benefits depend heavily on leveraging capabilities by aligning structures and resources 
between exchange parties, intensive cooperation is necessary ensure that they are attained. In 
the BPO context, a great degree of embeddedness is critical from a governance perspective. 
However, relational governance has not been seen as a substitute for contractual governance  
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in embedded relationships (Heide, 1994; Sobrero and Schrader, 1998). Contractual 
mechanisms legally define obligations and therefore complement relational governance. As 
governance can even comprise institutional arrangements that are close to hierarchy based 
governance, the degree of integrative governance (quasi-integration or equity holding) might 
provide organizations with additional safeguards. But will these governance elements ensure 
the success of BPO? Will they even control for the effects of BPO on the outsourcer’s 
performance? Taking a firm-level view, we therefore aim to answer our second research 
question: 
RQ2: What is the impact of relational, contractual, and integrative BPO governance on 
the achievement of firm-level BPO success? 
By addressing these two research question, we contribute to research on outsourcing 
outcomes that has been demanded in outsourcing literature reviews (e.g. Dibbern et al., 
2004). In order to control for industry and cultural context, we analyzed BPO arrangements in 
the banking sector within a single country to address the two research questions (Chiasson 
and Davidson, 2005). The financial services sector was a logical choice to focus on, as it 
represents the second largest buyer of outsourcing services (Gartner, 2004).  
To answer our research questions, we analyze 137 BPO ventures at 254 German banks in a 
period between 1994 and 2005 and employ median difference tests to compare the 
performance of outsourcing banks with that of their peers, as well as panel regressions based 
on 2,642 bank-year observations. Based on this analysis, we are able to make four 
contributions: first, the outsourcers’ financial performance in terms of profitability and cost 
efficiency was increased significantly in a three year period following the outsourcing event 
compared with industry peers without BPO. The increase stems not from a reduction in 
workforce or overall cost savings but rather from increased employee productivity. Second, 
contractual and relational governance ensure an increase in profitability from BPO, but only  
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contractual governance enables the achievement of an increase in cost efficiency. Integrative 
governance approaches based on equity holding deals do not affect performance. Third, 
governance efforts have a negative effect on profitability but positively influence cost 
efficiency. Fourth, contract duration has a positive impact on cost efficiency.  
Our contribution to the academic literature is twofold. Firstly, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first empirical work addressing the long term effects of BPO on firm performance 
and one of the first studies on the economic outcomes of outsourcing at all. By combining 
survey techniques with the use of archival data we avoid a potential common method bias 
inherent in several empirical studies on the performance implications of IT-outsourcing. 
Secondly, we show how the economic outcomes of BPO can be achieved by contractual, 
relational, and integrative governance instruments.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 0 we review the existing 
empirical literature on the effects of outsourcing and different levels of vertical integration on 
firm performance. In section 3 we develop hypotheses on the effects of BPO on firm 
performance and the influence of BPO governance. Section 4 provides an explanation of how 
we constructed our sample and presents the descriptive statistics. Section 5 gives an overview 
of the methodology applied. Finally, in section 6 we present and discuss the results and try to 
break down the main drivers for performance gains in the target banks. We conclude the 
paper in section 7. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A large body of empirical literature addresses the interrelations between outsourcing and firm 
characteristics or firm performance before the outsourcing takes place to evaluate the 
rationale for outsourcing decisions. Most of the studies are focused on IT outsourcing in the 
manufacturing industry. Finding that low overhead costs, low cash reserves, high dept, and  
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declining growth rates determine outsourcing decisions, Smith, Mitra, and Narasimhan 
(1998) conclude that the main motives for outsourcing are cost reduction and cash generation. 
Hall and Liedtka (2005) present a similar result, showing that IT outsourcing is determined 
by poor performance, poor cost control, and short term cash needs. Focusing on the US 
banking industry Ang and Straub (1998) find that IT-outsourcing is best explained by high 
production costs and the large size of the banks when looking at firm characteristics. All 
findings point in the direction that firms in weak positions struggling with high costs and 
poor performance tend to outsource IT-operations to regain a better position in the market. 
Fritsch and Wüllenweber (2007), analyzing determinants of business process outsourcing in 
the German banking market, draw a different conclusion based on their findings. They are 
able to show that while BPO is still an element of cost cutting strategies it is also pursued by 
well-performing banks with a high revenue diversification. Thus they conclude that BPO is 
used as a strategic element in market differentiation strategies to gain further competitive 
advantage. 
Empirical studies on the outcome of outsourcing, especially its effects on firm performance 
are scarce. The research can be divided into two major strains. On the one hand authors 
measure outsourcing indirectly by using different proxies for the vertical integration of firms 
and thus determine the correlation of vertical integration and firm performance without 
referring to any outsourcing event. On the other hand, researchers use survey techniques or 
press cuttings to gather data on outsourcing and compare the performance of firms that have 
outsourced business functions with that of non-outsourcing firms. However, only one study 
analyzes the direct effects on firm performance within one year after the outsourcing event, 
while other research does not take into account the date of the outsourcing event. An 
overview of empirical studies and their findings is given in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
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In an early study, D'Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994) analyze the influence of vertical 
integration on the costs and profitability of 3185 manufacturing lines of 466 large US 
companies between 1975 and 1977. They compare the hypothesis that vertical integration 
results in economies against the alternative hypothesis that vertical integration leads to higher 
bureaucracy costs. Vertical integration is measured by the value of inter-company transfers 
between different units over sales and cost of sales. While they find evidence for both 
hypotheses, they demonstrate that the benefits of vertical integration outweigh its costs and 
thus conclude that a high level of vertical integration is favorable for manufacturing firms. 
Görzig and Stephan (2002) analyze the impact of outsourcing on the firm level performance 
of German manufacturing firms in the period between 1992 and 2000 using a large dataset of 
43,000 firm-year observations. They use three proxies to capture the degree of outsourcing of 
the firms: material inputs over labor cost, representing the “make or buy”-type of 
outsourcing, external contract work over labor costs as proxy for the outsourcing of 
production functions, and external services over labor costs. They can show that all three 
types of outsourcing lead to better performance in terms of return per employee. On the other 
hand, only increased material input has a positive influence on overall firm performance 
measured as return over sales while services outsourcing has a negative effect. 
Examining vertical integration and its impact on profitability and shareholder value in the 
global banking industry, Gellrich and Holzhäuser (2005) analyze a sample of 906 banks from 
9 Anglo-Saxon and European countries covering the timeframe from 1995 to 2002. 
Measuring the degree of outsourcing by value added over sales they find that banks benefit 
from either very high or low vertical integration, while banks which have no clear cut 
strategy regarding their level of vertical integration, and thus are “stuck in the middle”, 
perform worse.  
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Görg and Hanley (2004) analyze the effects of outsourcing, measured by total bought inputs 
over value add in the plant, on the profitability of 215 plants in the Irish electronics industry 
between 1990 and 1995. Distinguishing service outsourcing and material outsourcing, they 
find that only large plants profit from material outsourcing while they can derive no clear-cut 
results for service outsourcing.  
Girma and Görg (2004) study the determinants for outsourcing as well as the impact of 
outsourcing on firm productivity using panel data from UK firms in the manufacturing 
industry between 1980 and 1992. They use the value of industrial services received over total 
labor costs of the firms as a proxy for outsourcing intensity. They find that outsourcing 
intensity is positively related to labor productivity and total factor productivity only in the 
chemical and engineering sector, while it has no influence on the firms in the electronics 
sector.  
To our knowledge the first empirical analysis using survey techniques was conducted by 
Kotabe, Murray, and Javalgi (1998). They study the influence of service strategies on the 
market performance of US Fortune 500 service firms. Based on 100 returned usable 
questionnaires they find that the internal sourcing of supplementary services is negatively 
related to market performance. Thus they draw the conclusion that service firms should 
concentrate on core services while supplementary services should be sourced out to 
independent suppliers.  
Gilley and Rasheed (2000) analyze the influence of the outsourcing of core and peripherical 
functions on firm performance considering the moderating effects of firm strategy and 
environmental dynamism. They collected subjective data on firm performance relative to 
peers and outsourcing intensity from 94 manufacturing firms. The results of this study show 
no direct impact of outsourcing on firm performance. However, outsourcing is positively 
related to the performance of firms which pursue cost leadership and innovation  
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differentiation strategies. In stable environments outsourcing increases, while in dynamic 
environments outsourcing decreases, firm performance.  
Benson and Littler (2002) compare the effects of outsourcing of core and support functions to 
other restructuring measures of large Australian organizations using a survey among 4500 
firms in 1998. Of the 1222 respondents, 649 firms reported recent workforce reductions. The 
authors find that the most important reason for outsourcing was a change in the business 
strategy, whereas this was not the trigger for other restructuring measures. The main 
objective of outsourcing was the reduction of labor costs and an increase in labor 
productivity, which was indeed achieved by outsourcing according to the responding 
managers. On the other hand, firms that reduced workforce for other reasons than outsourcing 
reported similar objectives and achievements. The authors conclude that outsourcing cannot 
deliver labour cost reductions in excess of those produced by other forms of restructuring.  
Jiang, Frazier, and Prater (2006) study the effects of outsourcing on the firm level 
performance measures of 51 large US firms based on audited accounting data in a period 
from 1990-2002. To our knowledge this is the only empirical work that directly measures the 
effects of outsourcing after the actual transactions were completed. They derived the exact 
dates of the outsourcing events by searching the press for outsourcing announcements and 
measured the cost efficiency, productivity, and profitability of the firms involved within one 
year after the outsourcing, based on quarterly accounting data. Observing the absolute change 
of the performance measures and the development relative to a control group without 
outsourcing they find improved cost efficiency but no change in the productivity and 
profitability of the outsourcing firms. The authors conclude that the firms invest freed 
resources to further improve core competencies. Firms additionally utilize the cost savings to 
lower prices at the cost of higher profits to gain competitiveness in the market.  
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From the studies described above no clear conclusions on the impact of outsourcing or 
vertical integration on firm performance can be drawn, as some results are in favor of a high 
level of vertical integration while others are in favor of outsourcing. One reason for the 
contradictory results might be the various differing measurements of vertical integration as 
well as the different industries and time frames of the studies. On the other hand, some 
authors even find different results within their studies depending on the measurement of 
performance, the type of outsourcing, and industry sector. These findings tend to suggest that 
there is no strict relationship between vertical integration and performance, but that the 
impact of outsourcing on firm performance is influenced by various other factors. Studies 
using survey techniques to evaluate the degree of outsourcing of their sample firms overcome 
the potential flaws of the various measures for vertical integration. This approach also 
ensures that the firms observed have actually outsourced business functions, while an 
observed change in vertical integration (e.g. measured by bought in services over labor costs) 
may also stem from rising labor costs without any change in the value chain of the firm. 
However this approach comes at the cost of far smaller samples and possibly subjective 
biased data provided by the respondents.  
By focusing on one industry in only one country and combining survey techniques for the 
evaluation of the precise outsourcing date with archival data to measure the financial 
performance of the outsourcer we try to overcome the potential flaws and biases of former 
research discussed above. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Outsourcing objectives and success 
As research on objectives and success of BPO is scarce, we first review literature from an IT 
outsourcing context. Major intents and objectives for outsourcing IT have been identified as  
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financial, business, technological, strategic, and political benefits (Grover and Cheon, 1996; 
Lee and Kim, 1999). The most common benefits sought are financial, focusing on cost 
reduction and efficiency, improving cost control and transparency, as well as leveraging 
economies of scale, scope, and skill (Kern and Blois, 2002). Business and political intents 
have focused on enhanced business performance, process reengineering, and diminishing 
political debates about new IT projects (McLellan, Marcolin, and Beamish, 1995). Strategic 
objectives address the outsourcer’s ability to leverage the vendor’s capabilities to achieve 
strategic advantages (Lacity and Willcocks, 2001). Technological intents refer to access to 
technological expertise, improved and innovative services, i.e. the bank’s ability to exploit 
modern IT technologies and achieve IT continuity (Lacity et al., 2001). 
Although outsourcing motives might be multi-dimensional and should be considered 
cumulative rather than mutually exclusive, several studies indicate that there is a trade-off 
between achieving efficiency (cost and quality related) and strategic advantages (outlining 
strategic and transactional style) (DiRomualdo et al., 1998; Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
McLellan et al., 1995; Miranda and Kavan, 2005; Murillo-Zamorano, 2004; Priem, 2001; 
Weill and Broadbent, 1998). As outlined by Miranda and Kavan (2005), efficiency objectives 
are closely related to value capture (allocative efficiency) and strategic objectives are related 
to value creation (adaptive efficiency). However, there is a trade-off between value creation 
and capture: achieving value capture makes the organizational environment more secure and 
efficient, but hinders innovative, knowledge-creation processes. For example, vendors that 
are contracted to minimize costs will hardly suggest innovative systems or processes as this 
will not be rewarded by the client (DiRomualdo et al., 1998).  
For the BPO context, Wüllenweber et al. (2006) found a focus on core competencies, quality 
improvements and – only as a third priority – cost savings to be the most prevailing 
outsourcing objectives) (Wüllenweber et al., 2006)). Similarly, Willcocks et al. (2004)  
  - 11 -   
stressed the knowledge potential of BPO as even more promising in terms of leveraging 
knowledge gains compared to IT operations, since business processes are seldom community 
processes and closer to outsourcer’s core business. By leveraging the vendor’s and the 
outsourcer’s customer and social knowledge capabilities, the new services and products can 
be created in order to provide added-value.  
Overall, we conclude that BPO is often – but not necessarily – associated with strategic 
objectives. However, there is a virtual absence of literature addressing the achievement of 
different outsourcing objectives in a BPO setting.  
BPO and firm performance 
To measure the impact of BPO on the firms and consequently the “success” of the 
outsourcing arrangement, we use financial metrics since financial accounting data is publicly 
available. Relying on publicly available audited data has the advantage of providing a more 
objective evaluation of a firm's performance and characteristics than the perception-based 
intermediate metrics typically used in case studies (Smith et al., 1998). Further, respondents 
answers in surveys may be self-justifying (Ang et al., 1998).  
Previous studies analyzing either firm level determinants or financial impact of outsourcing 
employ several measures for profitability (D'Aveni et al., 1994; Görg et al., 2004; Görzig et 
al., 2002; Hall et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2006; Smith et al., 1998), cost efficiency (D'Aveni et 
al., 1994; Hall et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2006; Smith et al., 1998), and factor or labour 
productivity (Girma et al., 2004; Görzig et al., 2002; Jiang et al., 2006). Some authors also 
use different financial measures like financial slack, free cash flow or growth rates to explain 
the firm level consequences of outsourcing. In our study we will focus on the profitability and 
cost efficiency of the outsourcing banks, as these two instruments are commonly used to 
define financial targets in banking. We will, however, use other different financial metrics to 
try to decompose the effects of outsourcing on profitability and cost efficiency as, from an  
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accounting point of view, an increase in profitability, for example, can either stem from a 
reduction in costs, an increase in revenue, or both. Thus we also analyze the change in overall 
costs and labor productivity. As an important objective for outsourcing has been found to be 
workforce reduction (Benson et al., 2002), we also analyze whether BPO has an impact on 
the size of the banks’ workforce . 
An increase in cost efficiency or cost reduction is still one of the major objectives of 
outsourcing. In a nutshell, the decision to outsource can be regarded a special form of the 
“make-or-buy” decision (Görg et al., 2004), where firms would prefer to “buy” as opposed to 
“making” certain services as long as the cost of outsourcing is lower than in-house 
production. As outsourcing vendors typically provide services to many clients they can 
achieve cost advantages over single firms’ productions costs as they benefit from economies 
of scale and centralization of expertise (Heshmati, 2003; Jiang et al., 2006; Roodhooft and 
Warlop, 1999). Additional cost savings can stem from lower wage levels of the service 
provider (Abraham and Taylor, 1996). If vendors pass on their production advantages via 
lower costs to their clients, the outsourcing firms will benefit from this transaction in terms of 
higher cost efficiency by producing the same output at lower costs.  
As we analyze the BPO of highly standardized back office processes which are provided by a 
small number of service providers to a large number of banks, we can assume that these 
theoretical considerations can be applied to our research settings. Thus we propose that the 
outsourcing banks will improve their overall cost efficiency by BPO. 
Hypothesis 1A: BPO leads to improved cost efficiency of the banks. 
Firms can maximize returns on internal resources by concentrating investments and energies 
on core competencies (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994). Outsourcing will enable firms to transfer  
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resources from non-value added staff functions to value-added core functions (Hayes, 
Hunton, and Reck, 2000).  
The outsourcing firms can also utilize the superior knowhow of the service provider to 
enhance their own production capabilities, which enables them to offer higher value and thus 
higher margin bearing products to their customers (Quinn et al., 1994).  
On the other hand, prior research also stresses the downside risks of a negative impact on 
firm performance if firms choose to outsource major components (Murray, Kotabe, and 
Wildt, 1995). Murray and Kotabe (1999) define those components as elements that 
differentiate a firm’s product from those of its competitors but within the domain of a firm’s 
core competency. As BPO takes place closer to the outsourcer’s core compared to IT 
outsourcing or the outsourcing of supplementary services, one could argue that BPO will 
have a negative impact on profitability. However banks can hardly be distinguished in the 
eyes of their customers by the back office processes we focus on in this study,. Thus we 
conclude that the opportunities provided by BPO will outweigh the risks, and banks will 
benefit from BPO in terms of profitability. 
Hypothesis 1B: BPO leads to improved profitability of the banks. 
Outsourcing governance 
As research on BPO governance is scarce, we first review literature findings from the IT 
context. In the IT discipline, governance has been defined as ‘specifying the decision rights 
and accountability framework to encourage desirable behavior in the use of IT’ (Weill, 2004, 
p.8). As a strategy though, we consider governance not just in terms of pre-specified 
frameworks, but also those frameworks that emerge in interactions between client and 
provider (Mintzberg, 1978). Three forms of governance that corporations can choose when 
considering make-or-buy decisions are widely recognized: 1) the hierarchy is an  
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institutionally derived, authority-based form where all operations are performed in-house; 2) 
the market is an institutionally derived and transaction-based governance form where all 
operations are ‘purchased’ from external providers; 3) the network (or hybrid) is a socially-
derived informal form where operations are performed partly in-house and partly externally 
(Shapiro, 1987; Williamson, 1994). These forms differ with respect to governance structures: 
research on inter-organizational relationships, and, more recently, on IT outsourcing, has 
recognized the existence of arm’s length vs. embedded governance structures in inter-
organizational relationships (e.g. Jarillo, 1988; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2005; Lee, 
Miranda, and Kim, 2004). Arm’s length relationships are those that are exclusively economic 
and rely solely on formal means of governance, i.e. contract governance. Embedded 
relationships are those in which the economic and social content of the relationship overlap 
and the social relationship as relational governance is tapped in order to regulate the 
relationship. Both governance structures can be used in all three governance forms, but differ 
in importance and granularity (see (Lee et al., 2004) for a detailed discussion).  
Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) has been said to have unique potentials (DiRomualdo et 
al., 1998; Gottfredson et al., 2005; Willcocks et al., 2004) that are accompanied by 
distinctive risks (Aron et al., 2005; Mani et al., 2006). When BPO benefits depend heavily on 
leveraging capabilities by aligning structures and resources between exchange parties, 
extremely close cooperation is necessary to attain them. Thus, in the BPO context, a high 
level of embeddedness is critical from a governance perspective. Relational norms and 
attributes have to enable mechanisms of clan control and trust based management. 
Nevertheless, relational governance has not been seen as substitute for contractual 
governance in embedded relationships (Heide, 1994; Sobrero et al., 1998). Contractual 
mechanisms legally define obligations and provide exchange parties with an instrument of 
control and escalation even if there is a great extent of risks.   
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We conclude that BPO is a network governance form that is structured using both relational 
and contractual governance mechanisms. As outlined by Dyer (1997), this governance 
approach can be complemented by quasi-integration (that he calls ‘hostages arrangements’) 
where the outsourcer holds equity ownership. Equity holding deals can be seen as a sub-form 
of hybrid governance. They include long-term contractual relations with different degrees of 
autonomy: the more the equity held by the outsourcer, the less the autonomy preserved for 
the vendor (Hewitt-Dundas, 2001). In particular, there is distinct threshold of equity 
ownership that differentiates between equity ventures deterring opportunistic behavior (above 
threshold) and ventures that allow opportunistic behavior (below threshold) (Gulati, 1995). 
More generally, outsourcers expect a greater degree of control with higher degrees of equity 
holding. As equity holdings are a form of quasi-integration, the corresponding governance 
approaches are hereafter called ‘integrative governance’.  
Within this paper, our conceptualization of BPO governance comprises the three governance 
elements described above: relational governance, contractual governance, and integrative 
governance (quasi-integration). As each of these governance elements can be measured using 
different constructs, Table 2 provides the constructs used for these governance elements in 
this study and the literature where these constructs are taken from.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Several studies have shown that trust leads to outsourcing success (e.g. Kern and Willcocks, 
2000; Lee et al., 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Sabherwal, 1999). Competence-based trust 
substitutes the necessity of previous business relations that would allow client and vendor to 
get a better understanding of what type of agreement is being entered into (scope) and what 
the specific expectations of both parties about that agreement are (Sargent, 2006). It relies on 
an impled guarantee that the vendor will bring in their expertise to achieve mutual gains and  
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is not willing to imperil their market reputation by underperformance. We therefore 
hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2A: Relational governance positively impacts on BPO success. 
Individually negotiated contracts (as proxy for contractual governance) allow one to set tight 
service level objectives and negotiate fixed prices to ensure desired quality levels and cost 
savings. Individually negotiated contracts can even help to achieve quality improvements or 
to create an appropriate environment to stipulate innovations (DiRomualdo et al., 1998; 
Miranda et al., 2005). In particular, annual renegotiation of service levels, requested volume 
of service and a bonus system can make the contract flexible enough to improve operations 
(DiRomualdo et al., 1998). The contract can even incorporate clauses on agreed service 
objectives including innovation chapters (DiRomualdo et al., 1998). We therefore 
hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2B: Contractual governance positively impacts on BPO success. 
We expect that higher degrees of integrative governance will lead to BPO success. Equity 
holdings are intentionally chosen when relational (e.g. opportunistic behavior) and/or 
performance risks are high (Hewitt-Dundas, 2001). In other words, integrative governance 
complements relational governance to overcome the problem of incomplete contracts (Hart, 
1998). We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2C: Integrative governance positively impacts on BPO success. 
To test the above derived hypotheses on governance and BPO success we analyse the effect 
of the different constructs for governance on the gains in profitability and cost efficiency of 
the banks in a three year period after the BPO.  
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Transaction costs 
Contractual relationships are associated with transaction costs which can stem from 
negotiating and writing contracts, monitoring contractual performance, enforcing contractual 
promises, or breaches of contractual promises (Joskow, 1985). Thus, analyzing the financial 
impact of BPO on firms, we also have to control for transaction costs which are related to the 
outsourcing arrangement. However, we are not able to observe those transaction costs 
directly as most firms do not quantify the costs of vendor selection or contract negotiations 
separately from other overhead costs and, if even those figures were available, it is unlikely 
that these costs would be revealed in a survey. We therefore observe contract duration and 
monitoring effort of the outsourcing contracts as proxies for transaction costs for (repeated) 
contract negotiations and for the enforcement of contractual performance and promises. As 
we could not find clear cut scenarios on the effects of contract duration and monitoring effort 
on firm performance in the theoretical literature, and empirical evidence is scarce, we will not 
formulate hypotheses on the direction of these effects on the financial performance of the 
outsourcer. 
Vendor performance is influenced by the monitoring effort of the outsourcer (Ngwenyama 
and Bryson, 1999). Diligent monitoring will force the vendor to meet the promised 
performance levels and avoid costs associated with breaches of contractual promises. On the 
other hand, increased monitoring effort will increase the costs for the additional resources 
necessary to control the vendor.  
As contract (re-)negotiations or even the evaluation of new suppliers are associated with 
transaction costs, shorter contract durations should influence the financial performance of a 
firm negatively. On the other hand Lacity and Willcocks (1998) find that most firms only 
sign outsourcing contracts for a period where the environment and requirements can be 
assumed to remain stable. Subsequently they can show that a change in environmental factors  
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was the main reason for outsourcing arrangements not realising the expected cost savings. 
They conclude that shorter outsourcing contracts are favourable for the outsourcing firms, as 
contracts can be adjusted to current external conditions (e.g. market price, technical 
standards) when they are re-negotiated more frequently. The processing of securities and 
payments is highly regulated and also highly standardized at least for plain vanilla products. 
Thus we can regard the environment for these back office services as being stable over a long 
period, which might be in favour of longer contract duration.  
DATA 
Sample selection 
The sample was drawn from the pool of 2,344 banks that were registered to conduct business 
in Germany in 2005. From this pool, the 500 largest banks were chosen based on total 
reported assets. The cumulative assets of these banks account for more than 90 per cent of the 
total assets in the German banking industry (based on (Bundesbank, 2006) and (Karsch, 
2006)). 
As the unit of analysis is an outsourced business process, we identified the BPO of two 
banking processes for investigation: settlement of securities and domestic payment. These 
processes are ideal candidates for BPO as they are digitally enabled and target areas for 
outsourcing as they do not represent core competencies, which banks typically do not 
outsource (Lamberti and Pöhler, 2004).  
In 2006, our questionnaire was sent to managers responsible for one of the back-office 
business processes in Germany’s top 500 banks. To ensure that the questionnaire was 
targeted to the most informed respondent, all banks were contacted by phone to identify the 
managers responsible for each of the two business processes. As not all processes in each 
bank are outsourced, the questionnaire first asked managers to indicate if the business process  
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is outsourced or not. The managers who indicated that it was outsourced were requested to 
complete the rest of the questionnaire, while the others were requested to inform us by e-mail 
that the process was not outsourced. Overall, we received information that 499 processes 
were outsourced and 372 were not. In total, 220 usable questionnaires were returned. 
Considering 499 outsourced processes, this implies a response rate of 44.1%.  
Non-respondents primarily did not participate due to lack of time or interest. To further test 
non-response bias, the difference between the demographics of the respondent group versus 
the non-respondent group was examined. For this analysis, bank size was used for a χ
2 
analysis. It turned out that no differences existed between the distribution of participants and 
the distribution of the original sample (χ
2 = 5.61, ρ < 0.5). Thus, in terms of bank size, our 
sample is not systematically biased. 
We only included banks in our sample were we could obtain information on the outsourcing 
status of both securities and payments processing. Omitting banks with incomplete 
information from our sample has the disadvantage of losing observations; however this 
approach ensures that we can construct unbiased sub-samples of banks that have outsourced 
processes and such banks without any BPO activities. At the very least we needed the 
information whether the process has been outsourced and the year the outsourcing took place. 
In total we received this information from 254 banks, of which 140 had not outsourced any of 
these processes. 15 banks had the securities processing process outsourced before 1991 (one 
bank as early as 1969). As our analysis covers the period from 1994 to 2005 and we are 
mainly interested in the effects of BPO on Bank performance in a three year period after the 
BPO takes place we include those banks in our control group as being without BPO events. 
Thus our control group consists of 155 banks in total. 32 banks report having only outsourced 
their securities operations, 29 banks report having outsourced only their payments processing,  
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and 38 banks have outsourced both processes. Thus, in total we find 99 banks and 137 BPO 
events in our sample in the timeframe between 1992 and 2006. An overview of the historical 
distribution of the BPO events is given in Table 3, Panel A. The majority of the banks started 
to outsource their processes after the year 2000 with a maximum of 25 BPO events in the 
years 2001 and 2004.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Accounting data are taken from the Fitch IBCA Bankscope database for a period from 1994 
to 2005. However we did not find accounting data for each bank in every year as BankScope 
contains more observations for recent years. Thus we can observe a different number of 
banks in each year with a maximum of 250 banks in 2004 (unbalanced panel). The full 
sample consists of 2642 bank-year observations for 254 banks over 12 years (Table 4). The 
number of employees was obtained from annual reports if it was not provided by Bankscope, 
however we were only able to find this figure for about three quarters of our sample.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
To perform the median difference tests of the change in bank performance in a three year 
period after the BPO event and to subsequently derive factors for successful outsourcing 
settings and the influence of governance on the outcome of BPO, we have to further reduce 
our sample as we can only include banks where we could obtain accounting data for the full 
period beginning from the year of the BPO until three years later, which automatically 
excludes all BPO events after 2002. These restrictions reduce our sample to 66 BPO 
observations. An overview of the reduced sample is given in Table 3, Panel B.  Six banks out 
sourced both securities processing and payments processing in the same year, which we count 
as one event, which leaves us with 61 BPO events for the median difference tests. As we 
collected separate questionnaires for each process that was outsourced, we use all 66 BPOs in  
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our regressions to evaluate the impact of governance. We use the calculated change in the 
performance of the banks that outsourced both processes in the same year as the value of the 
dependent variable for both processes and control for simultaneous outsourcing in the 
regressions.  
Variables 
To measure cost efficiency we use the cost-income-ratio (CIR) defined as operating income 
over total operating costs of the banks. Profitability is measured by the operating return over 
assets (ROA) which does not include extraordinary income from value adjustments to 
securities etc.. The change in total costs is measured by total operating costs normalized by 
total assets (cost-to-asset ratio). Due to the limited availability of data we are not able to 
observe the number of employees directly, thus we have to use personnel expenses as proxy 
for the size of the banks’ workforce. The change in size of the workforce is measured by 
personnel expenses over total assets, labor productivity is measured by operating income over 
personnel expenses. An overview of the performance measures as well as the control 
variables used in the panel regressions is given in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The variables used in the cross sectional regressions on outsourcing success are derived from 
the questionnaires. While the variables EQUITY_STAKE and INDIVUDUAL_CONTRACT 
are dummy variables, the variable measuring the perceived service provider process know-
how is based on a seven score Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 7=totally agree). Monitoring 
effort is measured by the annual effort in man-days reported by the respondents over number 
of employees of the respective bank. Contract duration is measured in years. If the 
responding manager indicated that the contract duration is unlimited we set the value to 20 
years. We also used lower (15 years) higher values (up to 30 years) for unlimited contract 
duration which did not alter the results. We also include a dummy variable for banks that  
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outsourced both processes in the same year to control for the effects of a simultaneous 
outsourcing of two processes. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in these 
regressions are given in Table 8. 
METHODOLOGY 
The goal of our analysis is to measure the direct effects of BPO on firm performance in the 
years after the actual outsourcing was completed. As this kind of analysis is scarce in the 
outsourcing literature we draw on the research on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) where 
effects of takeovers or mergers on firm performance following the transactions are frequently 
analyzed.  
To disentangle the effects of BPO from other economic or industry effects we compare the 
characteristics of banks after a BPO event to non-outsourcing banks in the same period. We 
focus our analysis on a three year period after the BPO. In our view the one year period 
proposed by Jiang et al. (2006) is too short to capture the full effects of BPO as the bank 
might face transitional costs which will lover the performance in the year after the 
outsourcing. Looking at a longer period than three years we can be less sure that other effects 
than the BPO events influence our results. Additionally, using a longer period would further 
reduce our sample. In the control group we include all banks from our survey that have not 
outsourced a business process. In the Bank M&A literature a similar approach of industry 
peer adjusted measurement of post merger performance is employed (e.g. Knapp, Gart, and 
Becher, 2005; Pilloff, 1996). Jiang et al. (2006) also compare outsourcing firms to non-
outsourcing firms to evaluate the effects of outsourcing events. 
We employ univariate median difference tests and multivariate panel regressions to evaluate 
the effects of BPO on firm performance. To perform the median difference tests we compare 
the change in the performance metrics of the BPO-banks to the change of the same metrics of  
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the control group in the same period. As many studies found different pre-event 
characteristics of outsourcing firms (e.g. Ang et al., 1998; Hall et al., 2005; Smith et al., 
1998), we do not look at the absolute values of the performance metrics three years after the 
event but rather at the change of these metrics over a three year period after the BPO to 
ensure that the observed effect stems from BPO. To test for the significance of the difference 
between the two groups we use a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed 
rank test.  
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where Z is any performance metric (cost efficiency, profitability), i denotes the values for 
bank i, T is the year of the BPO and T+3 is three years after the outsourcing.  
Following Focarelli and Panetta (2003) who analyze effects after bank mergers, we also 
perform panel regressions on the performance measures using a set of control variables and 
dummy variables for the years after the BPO event.  
(2) 

















, 1 , 0 ,
e
b b b b b a
+ × + × +
× + × + × + × + × + =
> + + +
Env δ BANK γ
 
where Zi,t is any performance metric (cost efficiency, profitability) for bank i in year t, α is 
the intercept, BANKi,t is a vector of bank-specific time-varying control variables, Env t is an 
environmental variable and ε the error term. A definition of the control variables is given in 
Table 5. preBPO is a dummy variable which controls for the performance of the BPO banks 
before the outsourcing takes place to ensure that the measured performance difference 
actually is related to the outsourcing event. Otherwise we could not be sure whether the BPO 
only performed better or worse after the BPO or already had a different level of performance 
before the BPO and the measured difference can not be related to the BPO-event. Thus this 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 for all banks that have outsourced a business process in  
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t i BPO  takes the value of 1 for 
the banks four and more years after the BPO and 0 otherwise. For all banks in our sample 
with no BPO event at all, all these dummies are zero.  
Some banks in our sample outsourced two processes at different times during our observation 
period. This has to be reflected in the BPO dummies. The first BPO of those banks is treated 
equally to banks which outsourced only one process. After the second BPO the BPO 
dummies reflect the second outsourcing. For example, if a bank outsourced the second 
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t i BPO  dummy, , reflecting the second BPO. As we expect the 
effects to increase over time this is a rather conservative approach which will underestimate 
the results. 
In a second step we want to analyze the influence of BPO governance on the success of BPO. 
For this purpose we test whether the variables reflecting the constructs for BPO governance 
explain the different development of the target banks compared to the control group 
employing OLS regressions. As endogenous variable we use the industry-adjusted gains in 
profitability (measured by ROA) and cost efficiency (measured by CIR) derived from 
equation (1). For each of the two endogenous variables we run multivariate cross sectional 
OLS regressions to estimate the effect of the influence factors discussed above, assuming a 
linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. We also include a 
dummy for banks that outsourced both processes at the same time to control for larger effects 
which might be observed if both processes are outsourced jointly. 
(3)  e m b a + × + × + = ∑
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with Z either ROA or CIR difference, β0 = regression constant, Fm = independent variable m, 
βm = coefficient of independent variable m, n = number of independent variables, and ε = 
error term. 
RESULTS 
BPO and firm performance 
Starting with the results of the median difference tests (Table 6), we observe an absolute 
increase in profitability, measured by ROA, in the three year period after the BPO of 0.06% 
while the ROA of the control group declined in the same period. The difference between 
BPO banks and control group is highly significant at a one percent level for the t-test as well 
as for the Wilcoxon test. While an absolute increase of 0.06% does not seem to be a large 
increase in profitability at first sight one has to keep in mind that the average ROA of the 
banks at the time of the BPO was 0.19%. Thus the observed change in ROA means a relative 
improvement in profitability of over 30 percent while the profitability of the control group 
decreased. Looking at the median difference test of the cost efficiency the results are not so 
clear. The cost-to-income ratio of both the BPO banks and the control group decreased after 
the BPO events, which is equivalent to an improvement in cost efficiency for both groups. 
The CIR of the BPO banks decreased by twice the value of the control group but the t-test is 
not significant. Only the nonparametric Wilcoxon test shows a significance of the difference 
at a 10% level. Thus, from our univariate analysis we can derive the results that both the 
profitability and the cost efficiency of the banks are improved following BPO with the 
limitation of a low significance for the cost efficiency. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We now turn to the other metrics to better understand the effects that lead to the observed 
improvements after BPO. The cost-to-to asset ratio, the proxy for overall cost changes, also  
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decreased for both groups. Again the BPO banks were able lower their overall costs to a 
greater extent, but the difference is not significant at all. Interestingly we can not observe a 
workforce reduction, measured by personnel expenses over total assets for either of the two 
groups. Finally, the variable measuring employee productivity increased significantly more 
for the BPO banks than for the control group. Both the t-test and the Wilcoxon test are 
significant at a 5% level.  
The results of the panel regressions depicted in Table 7 confirm the findings of the univariate 
analysis and, making use of the larger, full sample of outsourcing banks, are even more 
robust. The regression on ROA (R
2=0.22, p-value=0.00) shows that the ROA of banks prior 
to the outsourcing is lower than the average bank in our sample. The preBPO dummy is 
significantly negative. In years one and two after the BPO the ROA is not significantly 
different from the other banks, which is still an improvement. Only after three years and later 
is the ROA of those banks that outsourced business processes significantly better than the 
average banks. Thus we can show that banks were able to improve their profitability 
constantly after BPO and coming from a below-average-level were able to gain and maintain 
a profitability level above the industry average three years after the outsourcing was 
completed. The regression on the cost-to-income ratio (R
2=0.22, p-value=0.00) shows more 
robust results than the median difference tests. While there is no difference in cost efficiency 
before BPO compared to the industry average, the banks making use of outsourcing can 
improve the cost efficiency (lover the CIR) constantly over the next three years after BPO 
raising the efficiency above industry level. The effects even hold in the time after three years 
but the CIR again rises slightly.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
The BPO-dummies in the cost-asset ratio regression (R
2=0.76, p-value=0.00) show no effect 
after BPO at all. Only the preBPO dummy is positive and significant, indicating that the  
  - 27 -   
banks engaging in outsourcing had higher costs before the BPO event than their peers. After 
BPO they were able to lower their costs to the industry level. The workforce regression 
(R
2=0.78, p-value=0.00) shows no impact of BPO on the number of employees, measured by 
personnel expenses over total assets. Thus we can conclude that BPO was not used to reduce 
the workforce of the banks. On the other hand we can show that the employee productivity, 
the revenue per employee, increased after BPO. While we see no difference in employee 
productivity to the control group before BPO the productivity increased afterwards (R
2=0.78, 
p-value=0.00 of the regression).  
Our analysis clearly shows that banks are able to increase profitability and cost efficiency by 
BPO. Contrary to what one might have expected, BPO does not lead to a reduction in 
workforce. While the overall costs are slightly lowered to the level of the industry average, 
the main effect of performance improvement stems from increasing revenue. This additional 
revenue is generated by the same workforce, which is equivalent to an increase in employee 
productivity.  
The increase in workforce productivity might stem from the relocation of back office 
resources to revenue generating tasks. Especially in the smaller and medium sized banks in 
our sample, employees are responsible for sales tasks as well as for all related paperwork, 
entering transactions in IT-systems, etc.. Making use of the more sophisticated processes and 
systems of the service provider and being freed from non revenue generating administrative 
tasks, employees can spend more time with customers and thus increase the sales effort of the 
bank. In larger banks the same effect can be achieved by transferring the back office staff to 
the vendor and hiring sales staff at the same time.  
The observed increase in revenue may also stem from an advanced product portfolio the bank 
is able to offer utilizing the specialized know-how of the service provider. Banks can now sell  
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more complex products which they could not have processed while the back office tasks were 
still performed in-house.  
The influence of BPO governance 
We now look at the results of the influence of outsourcing governance on BPO success 
measured by gains in performance and cost efficiency (Table 10). To better understand the 
results of this analysis we should point out that negative coefficients in the cost-to-income 
regression imply a positive influence of the corresponding variable on cost efficiency. The 
control variable for the simultaneous outsourcing of both processes is not significant in both 
regressions, which shows that the simultaneous outsourcing of two processes at the same time 
does not lead to a better performance than the outsourcing of only one process. On the other 
hand that means that it is favorable for banks to outsource processes one at a time to increase 
the benefits.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Partly confirming hypothesis 2A, relational governance has a strong positive influence on the 
profitability of the outsourcing bank. As the perceived process knowhow of the service 
provider leads to increased revenue for the outsourcing bank, we can conclude that the 
management of the outsourcing bank makes use of the enhanced processing capabilities of 
the service provider and enriches the product portfolio offered to the customers. This finding 
provides additional evidence that BPO enables the banks to sell more complex, higher margin 
bearing products which they could not have offered when the back office processing was still 
performed in-house. 
On the other hand, the process know-how of the service provider does not seem to influence 
the cost efficiency of the banks. If indeed the banks do make use of the additional capabilities 
of the service provider and sell more sophisticated products, this might explain the higher  
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costs of the back office services. While this will increase the overall profitability, as these 
products generate more revenue, the cost efficiency is not improved.  
Contractual governance has a positive influence on both profitability and cost efficiency, 
which confirms hypothesis 2B. Banks benefit from individual contracts as the services 
provided by the vendor are tailored to the specific needs of the banks. 
The variable EQUITY_STAKE, the proxy for integrative governance, is not significant in 
either regression. Thus we can deduce that integrative governance has no influence on 
outsourcing success. It does not make any difference whether the firm providing the 
outsourcing services is (partially) owned by the outsourcing bank. Thus hypothesis 2C is not 
supported by our results. 
The monitoring effort required to control the service provider has a different effect on the two 
metrics of bank performance. High monitoring effort leads to lower profitability as it ties up 
resources in controlling activities which can not be used in an efficient way to generate more 
revenue. As we have seen in the breakdown of the effects of BPO on profitability, banks 
seem to shift resources from back office functions to more customer-related functions. The 
more resources there are involved in the monitoring process, the less effort can be focused on 
sales related functions. On the other hand diligent monitoring of the BPO arrangement can 
improve the cost efficiency as we can see from the cost-to-income regression. Tight control 
mechanisms will force the service provider to meet the targets and service level agreements 
agreed upon.  
Contract duration only has an effect on cost efficiency while profitability is not affected. The 
longer the contract duration, the higher the operational cost savings achieved by BPO. We 
can conclude that long term contracts do not have the disadvantage of locking in terms and 
conditions which become unfavorable for the banks over time. Long term contracts seem to  
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encourage both parties to invest more in the relationship and to put more emphasis on 
ongoing process improvements, which has positive effects on the cost efficiency of the 
outsourcer. 
Limitations 
Our findings provide interesting insights into the way BPO affects firm performance. 
However, several limitations have to be considered. First, we have no insight into firm 
strategy. We imply that at least one target of BPO was an improvement in firm performance. 
We can not control for other strategic factors which might have an effect on firm 
performance, e.g. there might have been a strategic realignment preceding the BPO decision 
resulting in a stronger performance orientation of the banks. Second, we can not directly 
observe the mechanisms of the way BPO affects firm performance. Our explanations are 
based on indirect measures and hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature on 
outsourcing. For example we have no direct evidence that employees are redeployed to more 
value-generating tasks after BPO. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper tries to answer two research questions: what is the impact of BPO on firm 
performance and how is the outsourcing success influenced by BPO governance? 
Based on an analysis of 137 BPO ventures at 254 German banks in a period between 1994 
and 2005 we find that the outsourcer’s financial performance in terms of profitability and cost 
efficiency was increased significantly compared to industry peers without BPO in a three 
year period following the outsourcing event. We employ median difference tests to compare 
the performance of outsourcing banks to their peers as well as panel regressions based on 
2,642 bank-year observations. Breaking the impact of BPO down further, we find that the 
main effects stem from increased revenue which is generated with an unchanged level of  
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resources. Thus, we do not observe a reduction in workforce, but rather increased employee 
productivity, i.e. the banks are able to generate more revenue per employee. We conclude that 
the increase in workforce productivity stems from the relocation of back office resources to 
revenue generating tasks. Making use of the more sophisticated processes and systems of the 
service provider and being free of non revenue generating administrative tasks, employees 
can spend more time with customers and thus increase the sales effort of the bank. In lager 
banks the same effect can be achieved by transferring the back office staff to the vendor and 
hiring sales staff at the same time. The observed increase in revenue may also stem from the 
advanced product portfolio the bank is able to offer utilizing the specialized know-how of the 
service provider. Banks can now sell more complex products which they could not have 
processed while the back office tasks were still performed in-house. 
In a second step using the excess performance of outsourcing banks as endogenous variables, 
we can show that BPO governance influences outsourcing success in terms of financial 
performance. Individually negotiated outsourcing contracts help to improve the cost 
efficiency as well as the profitability of the banks. Using a construct of competence-based 
trust, we also find that relational governance has a positive influence on profitability after 
BPO. We conclude that the management of the outsourcing banks make use of the enhanced 
processing capabilities of the service provider and enrich their product portfolio if they have a 
high level of confidence in the know-how of the service provider. 
Our contribution to the academic literature is twofold. Firstly, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first empirical work addressing the long term effects of BPO on firm performance 
and one of the first studies on the economic outcomes of outsourcing at all. By combining 
survey techniques with the use of archival data we avoid a potential common method bias 
inherent in several empirical studies on performance implications of IT-outsourcing.  
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Secondly, we show how the economic outcomes of BPO can be achieved by contractual, 
relational, and integrative governance instruments.  
This paper sheds light on the long term implications of BPO on firm performance and the 
influence of BPO governance from a bird’s eye view. Further research based on long term 
case studies of single outsourcing ventures could provide more evidence from an inside view 
of how exactly the organization is affected by BPO and by what mechanisms the 
achievements impact overall firm performance.  
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Table 1: Empirical research on vertical integration and outsourcing 















Value of inter-company 
transfers between 
different units over 
sales and cost of sales 
High vertical integration has 







·  Material input over 
labor cost 
·  External contract 
work over labor 
costs 
·  External services 
over labor costs 
·  Better performance in terms 
of return per employee for all 
types of outsourcing 
·  Increased material input: 
positive influence on return 
over sales  
·  Services outsourcing: 









Value add over sales  Banks benefit from either a very 







Total bought inputs 
over value add 
·  Large plants profit from 
material outsourcing 









received over total 
labor costs 
Positive effects only in some 
sectors 








Survey  Outsourcing of supplemtary 
services positive influence 
(Gilley et 
al., 2000) 
Manufacturing  Not 
dis-
closed 
Survey  No direct impact of outsourcing 
on firm performance 






1998  Survey  Reduction of labor costs but 
reduction through outsourcing 
does not exceed reduction through 
other forms of restructuring 
(Jiang et 
al., 2006) 
Cross industry  1990-
2002 
Search for outsourcing 
deals in news clippings 
·  Outsourcing improves cost 
efficiency 
·  No improvement of 
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Table 2: Governance constructs 
Governance  Construct  Definition  Informing literature 
Relational   Competence 
based trust 
Expectation of technically 
competent role performance: using 
supplier’s experience and expertise 
as self-enforcing mechanism.  
(Barber, 1983; Hewitt-Dundas, 
2001; Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman, 1995; Woolthuis, 
Hillebrand, and Nooteboom, 
2005; Zaheer and Venkatram, 
1995) 




Standard contract: off-the-shelf, 
externally provided contract that is not 
adjusted to outsourcer’s specific 
needs.  
Individual contract: individually 
negotiated contract clauses.  
(Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993; 
Lee et al., 2004; Woolthuis et al., 
2005; Zaheer et al., 1995) 
(Hewitt-Dundas, 2001) 
Integrative  Level of 
quasi-
integration 
Extent to which the outsourcer holds 
equity in the vendor 
(Blois, 1972; Hewitt-Dundas, 
2001; Zaheer et al., 1995) 
 
 
Table 3: Historical distribution of BPO events 
Panel A: Full sample Panel B: Reduced sample
Year
1992 1 0 1
1993 1 2 3
1994 4 0 4 3 0 3
1995 2 0 2 1 0 1
1996 1 0 1 0 0 0
1997 2 1 3 2 1 3
1998 5 1 6 3 1 5
1999 4 3 7 4 2 6
2000 12 4 16 11 3 14
2001 6 19 25 6 16 22
2002 7 8 15 7 6 13
2003 5 8 13
2004 13 12 25
2005 4 6 10
2006 3 3 6
Total 70 67 137 37 29 66
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Table 4: Panel data, bank – year observations 













Total 2,642 100  
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Table 5: Definition of variables 
Variable Definition
Performance measures
ROA Operating return over total assets (%)
CIR Cost-to-income ratio (%)
COST/ASSET Total operating costs over total assets (%)
EMPL/ASSET Total personnel expense over total assets
EMPL/PROD Employee productivity; Total operating return over total personnel 
expense (%)
Control variables panel regression
SIZE Log of total assets
LOANS/DEPOSITS Total loans over deposits (%)
OTHEROPERATINGINC/ASSETS Other operating income (excluding interestincome) over total assets (%)
PERSONNELEXPENSE/OVERHEADS Total personnelexpense divided by total overhead costs (%)
REVENUEDIVERSIFICATION Revenue diversification; Adjusted herfindahl index based on interest 
income, fee income, and other income
OFFBALANCESHEET/ASSETS Off balance sheet items over total assets (%)
LOANSLOSSPROV/NETINTREV Loans loss provisions divided by net interest revenue (%)
EQUITYTOTALASSETS Equity over total assets (%)
NETINTERESTMARGIN Net inerest margin (%)
GDPGROWTH Annual growth of the Gross domestic product in Germany (%)
Source: United Nations Statitics Division
SAVINGS Dummy variable for savings banks
COOPERATIVE Dummy variable for co-operative banks
MORTGAGE Dummy variable for mortgage banks
Endogenous variables: Cross sectional regression; Influence of BPO governance
SIMULTANEOUS_OUTSOURCING Dummy variable, takes the value of 1 if the bank sourced out both 
processes in the same year
SUP_PROCESS_KNOW_HOW Perceived process know-how of the service provider; Likert scale ranges 
from 1=strongly disagree to 7=totally agree
INDIVUDUAL_CONTRACT Dummy variable; 1 for individual contracts, 0 for standard contracts
EQUITY_STAKE Dummy variable; 1 if the service provider is (partly) owned by the 
outsourcer
MONITORING_EFFORT Annual effort to control the BPO venture in man-days reported by the 
respondents over number of employees
CONTRACT_DURATION Contract duration in years. The variable is set to 30 for unlimited 
contracts
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Group Difference p-Value p-Value
ROA 61 0.06 -0.01 0.07 3.25 *** 0.00 3.15 *** 0.00
CIR 61 -3.15 -1.58 -1.57 -1.63 0.11 -1.68 * 0.09
Cost/Asset 61 -0.09 -0.01 -0.08 -0.84 0.41 -0.02 0.99
Personn/Asset 61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.83 0.63 0.53
Pers.-Product. 61 16.91 1.25 15.66 2.20 ** 0.03 2.13 ** 0.03




  - 42 -   
Table 7: Panel regressions 
Endogenous Variables
ROA CIR Cost/Asset Personn/Asset
Control-Variables
SIZE 0.0452 * -4.664 *** -0.2317 *** -0.108 *** 34.339 ***
(1.93) (-6.45) (-7.25) (-6.86) (4.55)
LOANS/DEPOSITS -0.0002 * -0.0173 ** -0.0000 -0.0002 *** -0.0755
(-1.93) (-2.48) (-0.18) (-2.83) (-0.71)
OTHEROPERATINGINC/ASSETS 0.214 *** -3.8893 *** 0.4088 *** 0.2321 *** 21.0343 ***
(2.87) (-4.41) (7.57) (6.72) (3.05)
PERSONNELEXPENSE/OVERHEADS 0.0055 *** -0.6240 *** -0.0185 *** 0.009 *** -5.0328 ***
(3.37) (-11.8) (-8.63) (10.1) (-8.99)
REVENUEDIVERSIFICATION -0.6523 * 12.1235 0.7546 *** 0.2635 * -91.5654
(-1.88) (1.49) (2.72) (1.72) (-1.54)
OFFBALANCESHEET/ASSETS 0.0003 -0.0046 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0381 **
(1.56) (-0.99) (-0.32) (0.42) (2.07)
LOANSLOSSPROV/NETINTREV -0.0025 *** -0.0309 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0008 *** 0.1705 *
(-4.75) (-2.62) (-3.58) (-4.78) (1.89)
EQUITYTOTALASSETS 0.0099 1.1823 *** 0.0357 *** 0.0196 *** -2.9842 **
(0.69) (3.97) (3.32) (3.40) (-2.01)
NETINTERESTMARGIN 0.0582 *** -6.3712 *** 0.2744 *** 0.1472 *** 42.0317 ***
(2.70) (-10.6) (10.9) (10.9) (5.28)
GDPGROWTH 0.0176 *** -0.4609 *** -0.0077 -0.0051 * 1.2971
(3.64) (-3.09) (-1.52) (-1.94) (0.98)
Institutional Dummies
SAVINGS -0.0150 4.8779 * 0.0794 0.0954 -49.3674 **
(-0.22) (1.87) (0.73) (1.60) (-2.40)
COOPERATIVE -0.0092 2.7993 -0.0125 0.0702 -32.4428
(-0.13) (0.95) (-0.10) (1.08) (-1.43)
MORTGAGE 0.0598 -15.032 *** -0.2631 ** -0.0186 236.1535 ***
(0.68) (-2.70) (-1.99) (-0.29) (2.79)
BPO-Dummies
PRE-BPO -0.0386 ** 0.8401 0.0384 ** 0.0160 -2.6662
(-2.05) (1.16) (2.02) (1.55) (-0.60)
BPO t+1 -0.0095 -2.3246 * -0.0180 -0.0037 18.6399 *
(-0.25) (-1.80) (-0.62) (-0.24) (1.84)
BPO t+2 0.0067 -2.4141 ** -0.0263 -0.0204 16.553 *
(0.33) (-2.38) (-0.95) (-1.29) (1.85)
BPO t+3 0.0429 * -3.3533 *** -0.0388 -0.0148 21.5814 **
(1.95) (-2.72) (-1.23) (-0.81) (2.20)
BPO t>3 0.0509 * -2.3809 ** -0.0041 0.0009 17.5173 **
(1.84) (-2.54) (-0.16) (0.057) (2.26)
Constant -0.5899 ** 148.848 *** 3.6209 *** 0.7654 *** 244.1565 **
(-1.99) (17.0) (8.80) (3.84) (2.47)
Number of Observations 2575 2573 2575 2575 2575
Number of Banks 253 253 253 253 253
R² 0.22 0.14 0.76 0.78 0.37
c² 113.8 496.0 1590 2173 205.4
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
z statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Pers.-Product
 
All regressions are controlled for multi-collinearity using variance inflation factors. We 
employ White-corrected estimators to control for heteroscedasticity.    
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics; Influence of BPO governance 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
ROA Median Difference 66 0.085 0.034 0.188 -0.226 0.648
CIR Median Difference 66 -1.908 -2.070 7.909 -25.665 16.515
SIMULTANEOUS_OUTSOURCING 66 0.179 0.000 1.000
SUP_PROCESS_KNOW_HOW 66 6.015 6.000 1.493 1.000 7.000
INDIVUDUAL_CONTRACT 66 0.119 0.000 1.000
EQUITY_STAKE 66 0.612 0.000 1.000
MONITORING_EFFORT 66 0.063 0.028 0.103 0.000 0.732






















































































































INDIVUDUAL_CONTRACT 0.07 -0.47 1.00
EQUITY_STAKE 0.05 -0.01 -0.27 1.00
MONITORING_EFFORT -0.10 0.08 -0.12 -0.03 1.00
CONTRACT_DURATION 0.11 0.16 -0.15 0.02 -0.03 1.00
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SUP_PROCESS_KNOW_HOW 0.0319 ** -0.1632
(2.02) (-0.23)




MONITORING_EFFORT -0.5028 *** -17.9881 *
(-4.24) (-2.01)




Number of Observations 66 66
Adj. R² 0.20 0.16
F 4.504 3.059
p-value 0.00 0.01
t statistics in parentheses







All regressions are controlled for multi-collinearity using variance inflation factors. We 
employ White-corrected estimators in the ROA-regression to control for heteroscedasticity. 